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This article challenges the priority often given to ideals of legitimacy by those who seek a more 
“realistic” or “political” approach to political theory.1 In replacing justice with legitimacy as the 
central metric by which regimes are to be judged, political realists and others aim to make political 
philosophy less “idealized” or “moralistic.” Unfortunately, however, substituting one “master 
concept” (Freeden 2018, 356) for another does not make their theories any more useful to political 
actors seeking guidance in complex circumstances. Responsible political action requires weighing 
a variety of concerns, not zealous devotion to a single value (see Satkunanandan 2014). As such, 
granting strong priority to concerns of legitimacy improperly forecloses practical judgment. 
My argument is conceived in a realist spirit, and assumes some sympathy with recent critiques 
of what might be called “ideal justice theory.” My primary objective, then, is to challenge the 
widespread claim that prioritizing legitimacy constitutes a more realistic or politically useful 
approach. In short, I argue, many realists simply replace the familiar orientation towards a fixed 
state of (perfect) justice with a structurally similar orientation towards a fixed state of (sufficient) 
legitimacy. As such, their theories fail to provide more reliable practical guidance.2 
I also outline a more promising approach for realists to pursue. Rather than orienting action 
towards any state of affairs, I suggest that a more practically useful approach to political theory 
would directly address judgments, by comparing the concrete possibilities for action faced by real 
political actors. Though I can only offer a preliminary sketch here, this should be sufficient to 
establish it as a viable alternative methodology for political realism (see also Bagg 2016). And 
                                                          
1 This category is quite broad. In particular, I reject the narrow definition of realism in terms of the “autonomy of 
politics,” which is defended by certain realist authors (Burelli 2020; Rossi 2019) and singled out for criticism by 
opponents (Erman and Möller 2015; Leader Maynard and Worsnip 2018). As such, certain authors considered 
“moralists” by this standard count as “realists” for my purposes (see §3 for further discussion).  
2 Some realists may disavow the aim of practical guidance. Yet for many others, generating practically relevant 
guidance seems to be a central purpose of (realist) political theory (Ulaş 2020). 
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along with my critical project, these constructive suggestions support ongoing efforts to redirect 
realism towards more radical ends (e.g., Finlayson 2017; Prinz 2016; Raekstad 2018). 
I first consider a prominent strand of realist thought that grounds the priority of legitimacy in 
metanormative claims about a “distinctively political normativity” (§2). I then turn to procedural 
accounts emphasizing basic liberal-democratic legitimacy as the fairest response to disagreement 
about more ambitious ideals of justice or morality (§3). Though I build on prior critiques in both 
cases, my argument is novel in tracing their flaws to an orientation towards states of affairs—an 
orientation they share with ideal justice theory. By contrast, the “action-oriented” approach I 
propose in the following section aims to speak directly to particular actions and judgments (§4). 
There is one broadly “realist” argument for the priority of legitimacy that adopts something 
like an action-oriented approach, and I close by considering it (§5). Rather than privileging basic 
liberal or democratic legitimacy in absolute terms, moderation realists argue that defending it is a 
robust practical priority. Within many contemporary circumstances, they claim, any departures 
from status-quo norms will risk dangerous escalations of political tension, and must be avoided. 
As I demonstrate, however, this conclusion depends upon an incomplete picture of the relevant 
contexts of action. If we develop a more comprehensive account of the potential actors involved, 
as well as the constraints and opportunities they face, we cannot conclude that liberal-democratic 
legitimacy deserves the kind of priority it is given by moderation realists. In addition to defending 
the possibility of “radical realism,” therefore, rebutting their arguments enables me to elaborate 
the methodology I have sketched in the previous section. Relative to standard accounts, an action-
oriented realism offers more responsible and reliable guidance in difficult situations of judgment. 
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§2. The metanormative account: legitimacy as a distinctively political demand 
Drawing on the work of Raymond Geuss (2008) and Bernard Williams (2005), several scholars 
have argued that political realism means recognizing the autonomy of politics as a distinctive realm 
of normative inquiry (see, e.g., Burelli 2020; Hall 2016; Horton 2012; Newey 2010; Rossi 2019; 
Rossi and Sleat 2014). On this model, political philosophy is not merely applied morality: rather, 
politics has independent standards of justification. Where “moralist” or “ethics-first” theories seek 
to “import” moral standards into politics, that is, the standards with which we evaluate political 
orders must arise from within the political context and its signature practices (Sleat 2013b, 63).  
On Williams’ classic account, for instance, politics is sharply distinguished from brute 
domination, which is merely a state of war between rulers and ruled. If no legitimation story is 
offered to subjects, he argues, rule cannot be considered political at all. This need for justification 
is called the “basic legitimation demand” or BLD. It demonstrates how standards of legitimacy 
may be said to be immanent in political order, or in the concept of politics itself, and need not be 
imported from morality or ethics. If it may be deemed a moral principle in some sense, Williams 
affirms that “it does not represent a morality which is prior to politics” (2005, 7). 
This claim about the autonomy of politics is typically seen to justify an emphasis on legitimacy 
as a primary concern of realist political theory. As Matt Sleat writes, for instance, “a response to 
the political question need not be just, or fair, or equal… [but] it does have to be legitimate in order 
to count as an instance of politics rather than mere domination,” and thus, “the concept of 
legitimacy is central to realist thought.” (2013b, 48) In particular, legitimacy is often contrasted 
with justice, over which it is said to have priority. In Enzo Rossi’s formulation, for instance, 
“justice tells us how to exercise political power, whereas legitimacy tells us what the exercise of 
political power is for,” and thus, “the latter question should be prior to the former” (2012). 
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Yet claims about a “distinctive political normativity” have resisted a coherent and compelling 
interpretation. More specifically, critics charge that realists fail to show how “political normativity 
is genuinely separate from morality”—at least in any sense that is not “readily admitted by 
participants on both sides of the debate” (Leader Maynard and Worsnip 2018, 764; see also 
Baderin 2014; Bavister‐Gould 2013; Erman and Möller 2015, 2018). Even if we accept the BLD 
as inherent to politics, this seems only to shift morality back a step: instead of explaining why we 
should “practice politics in one way rather than another,” a moral principle is necessary to explain 
why we should “practice politics rather than something else” (Leader Maynard and Worsnip 2018, 
784; see also Erman and Möller 2015, 540–41; Miller 2016a, 162–63; Wendt 2016, 241–45). 
Advocates of the metanormative thesis have offered rejoinders (Jubb and Rossi 2015a, 2015b; 
Sagar 2018). On Edward Hall’s account, for instance, Williams never actually claims that we 
should practice politics. The BLD simply describes what states must do whenever they are 
practicing politics—i.e., in their relationship with full members of society—but it has no bearing 
on their non-political relations with non-members (Hall 2015; see also Sleat 2010, 496–97). If this 
interpretation is correct, it rescues Williams’ view from the charge that it relies upon a tacit moral 
principle. Yet it robs the account of its ability to provide plausible practical guidance. If we have 
no reason to “practice politics” towards non-members, after all, we have no reason not to enslave 
or dominate them—unless, as in liberal societies, full members of society happen find it distasteful. 
On this interpretation of Williams’ account, then, the principle of legitimacy as such raises no 
objection to slavery and other abhorrent practices (see also Wendt 2016, 236–37).3 
As Hall notes, this is by design: historically, many slave states have been widely considered 
legitimate, and Williams’ account enables us to avoid “fantastically unhistorical” judgments to the 
                                                          
3 Other interpreters of Williams reject the notion that this is a necessary implication of his account (Cross 2020). 
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contrary. This is fair enough, but still, it is hard to see why this historical observation should have 
any implications for normative theory, or the practical guidance we often hope to draw from it. At 
most, this view of legitimacy offers a partial accounting of the normative demands on political 
actors, instructing them to resist abuses of state power that full members of society consider to be 
intolerable. Yet if slavery and domination are not already considered intolerable, Williams’ 
account of legitimacy gives us no normative resources for resisting them. If the aim of a realist 
political theory is to give practical guidance, therefore, this account falls short. The only 
conscionable response to slavery is to make its elimination a top priority—even if it is not already 
intolerable to the non-enslaved, and even if doing so entails destroying regimes that may appear 
“legitimate” by Williams’ standard. If a distinctively “political” normativity says otherwise, it is 
not a “normativity” that deserves much weight in our actual political decisions. 
For these reasons, among others, many who seek more realistic or practically useful approaches 
to political philosophy are either indifferent to or openly skeptical of the metanormative thesis. 
Even some of its apparent defenders have recently retreated from it, arguing that it is based on a 
misreading of Williams, and was never central to the realist project (e.g., Jubb 2019).4 And though 
it has often been identified with realism as such, the metanormative thesis is not the only account 
of why legitimacy must be given priority. In the wider literature advocating more political, 
realistic, or practically useful approaches to political theory, indeed, it is not even the most 
common. That distinction belongs to what I call the “procedural” account.  
§3. The procedural account: legitimacy as a requirement of fairness 
Procedural arguments for the priority of legitimacy claim that moralistic theorizing about 
justice fails to take seriously the depth of political disagreement; demanding an unrealistic degree 
                                                          
4 Others have not backed down (Burelli 2020; Rossi 2019). I thank Matt Sleat and Rob Jubb for discussion. 
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of consensus. Given that real people disagree about justice and morality, it would be unfair to 
impose a particular theory on everyone. At the same time, we must make decisions somehow. 
These “circumstances of politics” (Waldron 1999) are thought to generate a distinctive “political 
question”: namely, “how we as citizens should proceed in the face of widespread and intractable 
disagreement over matters of justice” (Mason 2010, 659; see also Larmore 2018, 42; Sleat 2013b, 
63). In this context, proceduralists conclude, the only appropriate response is to use a procedure 
for making substantive decisions that is fair to everyone—or in other words, legitimate. 
Metanormative realists interpret these distinctively political circumstances as giving rise to a 
distinctively political normativity. Others, however, seek to answer the “political question” using 
normative resources that are avowedly “moral” or “ethical” rather than narrowly “political” 
(Leader Maynard and Worsnip 2018, 768–73). Though Charles Larmore (2018, 29, 42) denies the 
metanormative thesis, for instance, he maintains that “problems of authority and legitimacy” are 
“prior” to other questions, and should “constrain what can count… as the ideal of social justice to 
be pursued.” Similarly, David Miller  (2016a, 157–60) has sought to rescue Williams’ insight from 
dubious metanormative claims, instead noting similarities between the BLD and Rawls’ liberal 
principle of legitimacy. Though the latter is more “ambitious,” he notes, both respond to the 
“justificatory burden carried by exercises of political power” by demanding that states give 
acceptable reasons to everyone subjected to their coercion (2016a, 167, 174). For Andrew Mason 
(2010) and Jeremy Waldron (1999), by contrast, Rawlsian theory does not take the problem of 
disagreement seriously enough, and thus cannot respond properly to the political question. 
Whether friendly or hostile to a Rawlsian framework, all of these procedural approaches 
understand the task of properly “realistic” or “political” political theory as a response to a stylized 
set of circumstances designated as distinctively political. In Waldron’s influential formulation, for 
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instance, these circumstances can be analyzed as a “partial coordination game,” in which all parties 
prefer cooperation yet disagree about which form it should take (Waldron 1999, 101–5). And when 
we find ourselves within such political circumstances, it seems intuitive that finding a fair decision-
making procedure should be our first priority. As a result, proceduralists conclude, we cannot apply 
theories of justice and morality “directly to politics,” but must first consult intermediate “bridging 
theories” to determine how these goals may be legitimately pursued (Miller 2016a, 174). 
Yet critics have also raised serious concerns about procedural arguments for the priority of 
legitimacy (Wilson 2019, 75–95). We might think, for one, that it is unwise to make clear practical 
recommendations on the basis of a stylized set of circumstances. In particular, it is unclear whether 
the circumstances facing political actors can faithfully be described in terms of a partial 
coordination game. There is always a status quo, and those most satisfied with it enjoy a structural 
advantage over those who feel the “need” for collective action more urgently. Especially if the 
latter are in the minority, it is hard to see how majority rule treats them equally (see Bagg 2018c). 
More broadly, the proceduralist’s inference to the priority of legitimate procedures becomes 
much less intuitive as soon as we move beyond stylized circumstances and admit more information 
about the actual situations of judgment under consideration (Raz 1998, 45–46). In contexts 
characterized by vastly unequal power, for instance, it is hardly obvious that Waldron’s simple 
majoritarianism represents the fairest way of resolving disputes; much less that majority decisions 
deserve absolute priority when they conflict with other deeply held principles. It is no clearer, 
moreover, which institutions are actually “majoritarian” in a representative democracy comprising 
millions of federally distributed citizens such as the United States. Given these facts of real politics, 
it seems, there is simply nothing neutral or obviously fair about majority rule at the nation-state 
level. In other words, there may be just as much disagreement about legitimate procedures as there 
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is about “substantive” principles of justice, such that the former are no “better suited… to resolving 
disagreements” than the latter (Leader Maynard and Worsnip 2018, 768).  
The procedural approaches we have examined can thus be understood as a sequence of 
proposals to expand the scope of permissible disagreement, each of which faces a similar objection 
from the next. First, theorists making ambitious demands about justice, such as Rawls in A Theory 
of Justice, are criticized by “political liberals” like Larmore and Miller—and perhaps even the later 
Rawls himself, in Political Liberalism—for failing to account for the extent of disagreement about 
these substantive issues. The less demanding alternative they offer—i.e., the liberal principle of 
legitimacy—is then criticized on similar grounds by theorists such as Mason and Waldron, who 
seek to replace it with an even more basic, fully procedural, conception of legitimacy. Meanwhile, 
their account is still not basic enough for Williams, whose BLD contains few (if any) absolute 
requirements, and is allowed instead to vary widely between historical contexts. 
In Sleat’s view, finally, even Williams depends on an implausible level of consensus (2013b, 
112–29). Because the BLD demands that all citizens be offered acceptable justifications, Sleat 
argues that it remains hostage to unrealistic assumptions about which justifications people will 
find acceptable. Thus, even Williams’ avowedly minimalistic standard would appear to classify 
all hitherto existing political orders as illegitimate—precisely the kind of “unhistorical” judgment 
he sought to avoid. Sleat, by contrast, maintains that all liberal polities will contain “nonliberal 
persons” who must be coerced without being offered justifications they can accept. Few liberals 
are truly willing to face this reality, which Sleat makes central to his account (Sleat 2013a). 
In a sense, this represents the logical conclusion of the procedural realist’s case for legitimacy, 
and Sleat deserves praise for his comprehensiveness in this regard. Though liberal states will never 
be able to offer everyone a justification they can accept, he acknowledges, they can and should 
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serve as “restrained masters” over those they inevitably dominate. His account thus avoids 
requiring the unrealistic levels of consensus that haunted each preceding form of proceduralism. 
In its place, however, his account substitutes a different vice. As the scope of permissible 
disagreement expands, the requirements of legitimacy are weakened, and its claim to practical 
priority simply loses plausibility. If legitimacy is really such a minimal standard, in other words, 
it is far from clear why we ought to pursue it at the expense of other worthy normative goals. It is 
implausible, for instance, that basic legitimacy should always take priority over substantive ends 
like fighting racial and economic inequality or mitigating the effects of climate change. In retaining 
the formal structure of procedural legitimacy while insisting that the resulting standard be 
realistically achievable, it seems, Sleat backs himself into an unattractively quietistic corner. 
As a result, the foregoing sequence of procedural realisms may seem to vindicate a common 
criticism of realistic approaches. From Rawls through Larmore and Waldron to Williams and Sleat, 
we observe an inverse relationship between the “ambitiousness” of an ideal and the “realism” of 
its demands, such that the logical endpoint of the quest for a realist account of legitimacy appears 
to be Sleat’s ultra-minimalism. We might conclude with realism’s critics, then, that it is inherently 
conservative, reflecting unnecessary concessions to contingent realities (Estlund 2011, 2014).  
In my view, however, this supposed tradeoff between realism and ambition depends almost 
entirely on the assumption that political ideals must be oriented towards just or legitimate states of 
affairs. If we orient our ideals towards particular judgments, by contrast, we can develop political 
theories that are simultaneously ambitious and realistic—thereby generating more useful and 
reliable practical guidance for real political actors. Or so I shall argue in the following section. 
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§4. An action-oriented model of political realism 
On standard models of contemporary political philosophy, political ideals are meant to assess 
the normative justification of entire social systems or political regimes. They are often used to 
generate scalar evaluations and practical guidance in nonideal contexts as well, but such “applied” 
judgments are typically derivative of—or otherwise dependent upon—a prior picture of full justice 
or legitimacy. In various ways, therefore, the guidance offered by many different political theories 
is oriented towards some specific state of affairs. In this section, I show how this orientation causes 
trouble for two forms of ideal justice theory, prompting realist doubts about their ability to provide 
reliable practical guidance. I then show that realist accounts of legitimacy exhibit a similar 
orientation, concluding that if we are moved by realist critiques of ideal justice theory, we ought 
to be skeptical of prominent realist alternatives as well. Finally, I sketch a more promising 
approach to realist political theory, which addresses concrete actions and judgments directly, and 
therefore avoids the troublesome implications of an orientation towards states of affairs. 
§4.1. Ideal justice theory: two orientations towards states of affairs 
For many ideal justice theorists, a regime is fully just when its political institutions, social 
structure, and economic distribution meet certain conditions. Regimes should therefore be 
evaluated on the basis of how closely they approximate this state of full justice, and political action 
should be oriented towards attaining it. Williams labels this approach “enactment” moralism, 
meaning that “political theory formulates principles, concepts, ideals, and values; and politics… 
seeks to express these in political action” (2005, 1). For Williams, the paradigmatic example is 
utilitarianism, but Rawls’ Theory of Justice is often read along similar lines—i.e., as an ideally just 
set of institutional arrangements, which we must strive to achieve (Gilabert and Lawford-Smith 
2012; Hamlin and Stemplowska 2012; Phillips 1985; Sreenivasan 2012). 
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As critics have noted, however, such “transcendental” ideals are neither necessary nor 
sufficient for comparing concrete states of affairs (Sen 2009). Indeed, they may even yield actively 
harmful guidance. As Jacob Barrett notes, for instance, “making institutional arrangements more 
similar to the ideal can, due to combinatorial complexity, result in a decrease in justice, or, due to 
transitional complexity, constitute progress away from the ideal” (2020, 112; see also Wiens 
2015). In encouraging us to strive for a distant state of affairs, enactment moralisms tend to obscure 
these complex social dynamics, thereby leading us to ignore serious practical tradeoffs, as well as 
the unintended consequences of our actions (Farrelly 2007; Schmidtz 2011). They may urge us to 
pursue ideals that no real-world agent could responsibly pursue (Huemer 2016, 226–28). 
Most defenders of ideal justice theory are willing to accept this much (Estlund 2019; Simmons 
2010; Stemplowska 2008; Swift 2008; Valentini 2009). As Ingrid Robeyns puts it, ideal theorists 
must reject the temptation to “play with real-life examples,” which creates the “false impression” 
that their ideals can be applied directly in nonideal circumstances (2008, 360). Instead, they must 
accept that highly complex nonideal bridging theories are required to generate practical guidance, 
and that ideal theory constitutes “only a small fraction of all the work that needs to be done” (2008, 
352). Nevertheless, precious few actually pursue something called nonideal theory in practice, and 
even fewer do so on the model implied by ideal theorists: i.e., as a transitional account of the action 
required to reach or approximate a pre-determined ideal (2008, 348; see also Frazer 2016).5 
It is not hard to understand why. Given the vast distance between contemporary realities and 
the “fully just” regimes imagined by ideal theorists, little can be said with certainty—either about 
the consequences of implementing those regimes, or about the best way of reaching them (Barrett 
2020, 108–9). Indeed, the further we get from the sort of regimes and contexts we are familiar 
                                                          
5 A notable exception here is Shelby (2007) 
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with, the more speculative and uncertain our predictions become. As a result, many critics push 
their critique even further, doubting whether ideal theory properly plays any role in practical 
guidance whatsoever (Gaus 2016; Goodhart 2018; Levy 2016; Schmidtz 2016; Wiens 2015). As 
Barrett puts it, “we cannot identify the ideal institutional arrangement with sufficient confidence 
to warrant pursuing it at the expense of short-term justice. And even if we could, we would still 
lack the epistemic wherewithal to identify changes to our current arrangement that would 
constitute progress toward it with this requisite degree of confidence.” (Barrett 2020, 114–15) 
I do not adjudicate this dispute here. As noted, I assume some sympathy with recent criticisms 
of ideal justice theory’s ability to provide practical guidance. My aim in this article, rather, is to 
cast doubt on the prospect of providing more reliable guidance by striving for legitimacy rather 
than justice. Before turning back to realist arguments for prioritizing legitimacy, however, we must 
examine a second variety of ideal justice theory, which might seem to escape these criticisms. 
On these accounts, most basically, the presence of justice depends on the conduct of agents, 
rather than the achievement of specific outcomes. Robert Nozick objected to Rawls’ “patterned” 
account of justice as an “end-state,” for instance, favoring a “historical entitlement” account based 
on justice in transfer instead (1974). More recently, Elizabeth Anderson has criticized “luck 
egalitarians” for seeing justice a particular distributive state of affairs (1999). Instead, she favors 
a “relational” approach, whereby “justice as an evaluation applied to states of affairs is entirely 
derivative of justice as an appraisal of the conduct of agents” (Anderson 2010, 5, see also 2009). 
As Robert Jubb (2016) points out, this reflects broader disputes between consequentialist and 
deontological approaches to normative reasoning. Any theory that evaluates action on the basis of 
its teleological tendency to produce particular outcomes or maximize certain values, he argues, 
will exhibit objectionable features of consequentialism—even if it uses deontological reasoning to 
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decide which outcomes to strive for. On a more thoroughly deontological model, by contrast, a 
regime is just only if everyone within it follows certain norms of right conduct. In Jubb’s terms, 
therefore, such theories articulate “norms” rather than “evaluations.” Similarly, Williams (2005, 
1) understands them as exhibiting a “structural” form of moralism, in which “theory lays down 
moral conditions of co-existence under power, conditions in which power can be justly exercised.”  
Such “structural” ideals do not outline any specific pattern of distribution or substantive 
outcomes, which political actors must strive to reach, and this distinguishes them from the sort of 
“enactment” ideals discussed above. In my view, however, they are ultimately subject to many of 
the same critiques. They are still oriented towards a distant state of perfect justice, in which every 
agent has fulfilled their duties or behaved rightly. And given the immense complexity of social 
life, the obstacles they face in generating sound practical guidance are no less daunting. 
On the strictest deontological interpretation, of course, structural ideals do not seek to guide 
action towards the achievement of a state of perfect justice: they simply instruct people to obey 
certain norms of right conduct, and can be considered action-guiding in that respect (North 2016). 
In many cases, however—when others behave unjustly, perhaps—unilaterally following norms of 
just behavior will have obviously harmful effects. A common worry about deliberative ideals, for 
instance, is that when well-meaning actors abide by norms of sincerity and reciprocity, this simply 
facilitates domination by the unscrupulous (Bagg 2018b; Shapiro 2017; Young 2001). 
Structural ideals owe their plausibility to the thought that a society in which everyone followed 
moral norms would enable the just exercise of power. Yet absent “full compliance,” obeying those 
norms does no such thing. As realist critics point out, political contexts are “strategic” rather than 
“parametric,” meaning that success requires the cooperation of others (Hope 2016, 387; Huemer 
2016, 226–28; Schmidtz 2016, 6; Stemplowska 2016, 276–77). This poses a dilemma for structural 
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ideals: if they endorse unilateral compliance despite widespread noncompliance, they will often 
yield deeply counterintuitive guidance. If not, however, they simply generate no guidance at all. 
This explains why, despite explicitly disavowing the aim of achieving specific outcomes through 
political action, structural ideals should nevertheless be understood as oriented towards states of 
affairs. Since they generate plausible practical guidance only within a state of perfect justice, they 
are inextricably linked to, oriented towards, and perhaps even derivative of that state. 
As with enactment ideals, defenders of structural ideals usually accept that they are incapable 
of providing reliable practical guidance under nonideal conditions. Some renounce the project of 
giving relevant practical guidance altogether (Cohen 2003). More frequently, they make a similar 
call for nonideal bridging theories, which could outline the best norms to follow under conditions 
of partial compliance (Hamlin and Stemplowska 2012; Simmons 2010). Perhaps the most natural 
approach here is to articulate the conditions in which full compliance would be possible—or, at 
least, in which unilateral compliance would not be deeply counterintuitive—and then to orient 
political action towards the achievement of these conditions. In response to criticisms along these 
lines, for instance, many deliberative democrats now accept that non-deliberative tactics may be 
required to bring about a more purely deliberative politics (Fung 2005; Mansbridge et al. 2010). 
Yet clearly, this only reproduces the challenges facing enactment theories. And even if they reject 
a straightforwardly teleological orientation towards particular outcomes, meanwhile, those who 
articulate nonideal norms for responding to noncompliance cannot entirely ignore the realm of 
consequences. It is the obviously negative effects of unilateral compliance, after all, which make 
it so counterintuitive. As such, they must still face the obstacles posed by social complexity. 
Of course, not everyone accepts these critiques of ideal justice theory. Yet my argument here 
is primarily directed at those who do—and among this audience, many have turned to legitimacy 
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as a more promising target for theorization. In at least one crucial respect, however, such accounts 
fail to improve upon ideal theories of justice. Because they retain an orientation towards states of 
affairs, I argue, realist theories of legitimacy cannot provide more reliable practical guidance. 
§4.2. Realism as legitimacy: another orientation towards states of affairs 
We are now in a better position to understand this claim. For some realist proponents of the 
priority of legitimacy, a regime is (sufficiently) legitimate if it implements certain institutions. 
Waldron, for instance, defines legitimacy in terms of majoritarian elections. The resulting concept 
of legitimacy thus mirrors the concept of justice employed by enactment moralists, and this brand 
of “enactment realism” can expect to face parallel objections. For others, meanwhile, a regime is 
legitimate if and only if all of the relevant agents abide by certain norms. Most of the realists we 
have examined, for instance, understand legitimacy at least partly in terms of the justifications 
offered to the subjects of state coercion. We can understand this view as a form of “structural 
realism,” and again, we can expect it to face worries mirroring those facing structural moralism.  
Because ideals of legitimacy are typically less demanding than ideals of justice, of course, the 
states of affairs targeted by both enactment and structural realists will be marginally closer to 
reality than those targeted by their moralist counterparts. Because each realist theory of legitimacy 
is still oriented towards some state of affairs, however—deriving the appropriate action in any 
given circumstances from the requirements of (sufficient) legitimacy rather than those of (perfect) 
justice—its practical guidance will be no more reliable. In short, this exchange of one “master 
concept” for another does little to resolve the underlying challenge of providing reliable practical 
guidance in the face of massive social and political complexity. 
We may begin at the most “ambitious” end of the realist spectrum, with those who require 
significant public justification or deliberation as a condition of legitimacy. Whether this 
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requirement is conceived as a set of institutions that must be implemented, a set of norms that must 
be followed, or some combination of the two, it is usually quite distant from current realities. As 
a result, those seeking guidance will confront the same epistemic hurdles that limit our ability to 
discern which present actions are most conducive to distant ideals of justice. At best, they will 
require the use of extremely complex bridging theories to translate the requirements of the ideal to 
nonideal circumstances.6 As such, this approach makes no clear advance over ideal justice theory.  
Of course, less ambitious theories of legitimacy may appear more promising. Rather than 
asking us to discern which action is most likely to yield a deliberative utopia, Waldron appears to 
demand only that we defend certain minimal procedures. In fact, however, his account is no less 
dependent on idealizations, and his guidance is no more plausible. Indeed, where ideal theorists 
generally admit the folly of applying ideal justice theory directly to real world cases, Waldron 
claims the mantle of “political political theory” (2016), and seeks to do just that. On the basis of 
his observation that majority decisions treat everyone equally in the context of partial coordination 
games, for instance, he argues that we must always oppose counter-majoritarian measures like 
judicial review—no matter how unjust or shortsighted the majority decision appears (1999, 2005). 
As I suggested above, however, it is rather dubious to draw such concrete practical inferences 
from the intuitions generated by a stylized model. In the real world, some groups are vastly favored 
by the status quo, and so the metaphor of a partial coordination game is not very apt (Bagg 2018c). 
Thanks to agenda control, ideology, and other distortions enabled by the indeterminacies inherent 
to all collective choice procedures, meanwhile, the results of “majoritarian” elections are often 
predictably biased in favor of the interests of wealthy elites and other privileged groups (Achen 
and Bartels 2016; Gilens 2012; Lukes 1974; Riker 1982). In order to responsibly apply such 
                                                          
6 As suggested above, we can understand recent efforts to incorporate power and interests into deliberative theory in 
this light. For contrasting critiques of these efforts, see Medearis (2015, 37–44) and Owen and Smith (2015). 
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procedural theories of legitimacy in practice, we must employ a bridging theory to account for 
these deviations from the stylized circumstances that motivate their recommendations (Bagg n.d.). 
That said, there are certain realist accounts—like those of Williams and Sleat, for instance—
which do not appear to rely on any such idealizations, and thus require no bridging theories. In 
such cases, practical guidance can be straightforwardly derived from their proposed requirements 
of legitimacy. Yet this is only because the requirements in question are even less demanding. Such 
theories thus leave us in precisely the sort of unattractively quietistic corner that Williams and 
Sleat are frequently accused of occupying. At this most minimalistic end of the spectrum, in sum, 
the practical requirements of legitimacy are perfectly clear, yet there is no longer any reason to 
prioritize them over other concerns. So long as we remain on the terrain of legitimacy, in other 
words, the tradeoff between realism and ambition appears insurmountable. 
In my view, of course, occupying this terrain is the crucial mistake. On the standard model 
shared by ideal theories of justice and realist theories of legitimacy, more specifically, the point of 
a political theory is to assess the justification of entire social systems and political regimes. The 
precise target may be a set of political institutions, a pattern of economic distribution, or the joint 
product of many agents acting rightly. Insofar as a theory aims to be a political theory, however, 
it must be oriented towards the justice or legitimacy of the system as a whole. And this orientation 
towards holistic states of affairs has a number of important and under-appreciated consequences. 
To make such systemic analysis tractable, most basically, we must limit our scope to certain 
pre-determined features of the social systems in question. Before assessing the justification of any 
particular regime, that is, we must declare that certain elements of all social systems have unique 
normative significance or priority, as requirements of justice or legitimacy. In particular, realist 
accounts of legitimacy tend to adopt three scope-limiting assumptions. First, each theory positions 
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coercion as the primary politically relevant form of power in need of justification. Second, more 
specifically, each focuses on justifying the use of coercion by the state. And third, each theory 
conceives the legitimacy of a regime in terms of the degree to which state coercion can be 
understood as consistent with the agency or will of those subjected to it. In other words, justifying 
political power is a matter of ensuring that it is, in some sense, acceptable to its subjects. 
The realists we have examined are hardly alone in making these assumptions: on the contrary, 
they are often taken as definitive of political philosophy itself (Valentini 2009, 335). In my view, 
however, we ought to be skeptical of all three. As critical theorists have long emphasized, for one, 
there is no reason to treat coercion as uniquely deserving of political concern (Hayward 2000; 
Lukes 1974). In outlining his alternative vision of realist liberalism, therefore, Andy Sabl surmises 
that “an obsessive focus on the role of coercion… reflects either a fantasy of autonomy… or an 
overly defensive realist reaction to such a fantasy”—and that realists ought to discard it along with 
the “philosophical fairy tale” of autonomy itself (2017, 376). As Michael Freeden notes, 
meanwhile, the grounds are equally slim for reducing politics to the state—a choice that obscures 
“the horizontal and substate political practices in any society” (2018, 357). Indeed, Sabl denies the 
very existence of “the State qua unified entity embodying society’s political identity and normative 
position” (2017, 371). And just as there is no good excuse for regarding state coercion as singularly 
dangerous, finally, there are persuasive reasons to doubt that individual agency—its inverse—is a 
singularly valuable source of justification or legitimacy (Bagg 2018a; Coole 2005; Meehan 2017). 
It is beyond the scope of this article to outline my objections to these assumptions in full. 
Rather, my point is simply that many realists retain key assumptions from the ideal theories of 
justice they have sought to transcend—and by showing that we have reason to question those 
assumptions, I have sought to clear the way for an alternative model of political realism.  
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§4.3. Realism against legitimacy: an orientation towards judgment and action 
What is this alternative? As I have suggested, the key to escaping persistent tradeoffs between 
realism and ambition lies in an orientation towards the judgments and actions of particular agents, 
rather than the justification of entire social systems or political regimes. This need not prevent us 
from talking about such systems, or the ideals of justice and legitimacy typically used to assess 
them.7 I simply insist that we center the instrumental function such ideals will play—for particular 
agents facing particular choices—and formulate them with that function clearly in mind.  
Different ideals, after all, are useful in different contexts. The standard of legitimacy we use to 
evaluate the wisdom of engaging in nonviolent protest, for instance, will differ substantially from 
the one we should use in deciding whether to begin an armed rebellion (see Bagg and Knight 2014; 
Buchanan 2018). Similarly, different ideals will be useful to different agents. A community leader 
responding to police violence, for instance, will need different criteria than a candidate choosing 
how to campaign, or a military leader deciding whether to intervene to prevent an authoritarian 
party from taking power. In addition to serving as private heuristics to guide individual decision-
making, finally, principles of legitimacy may also serve as public commitments to which political 
actors may be held accountable, or legal rules to be interpreted juridically—such as a condition of 
entry to the EU, or a UN ruling on permissible humanitarian intervention. 
The contingency and context-dependence demanded by this approach chafes against a deep-
seated philosophical inclination to get to the bottom of things: to uncover a universal standard for 
assessing the legitimacy of regimes, for instance, from which we may derive guidance about 
protest, rebellion, and international rules. Nevertheless, the widespread call for more realistic and 
practically useful approaches to political theory suggests that there is already significant frustration 
                                                          
7 This distinguishes my approach from extreme forms of “anti-theory” that totally reject the use of general principles 
(see Hämäläinen 2009). Hämäläinen’s own preferred “instrumental” attitude toward theories is similar to mine. 
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with this abstracting, universalizing approach. Though I cannot make a decisive argument against 
that inclination, therefore, this section explores what happens if we decline to follow it. What does 
political theory look like if we orient it directly to the judgments political actors must make? 
This suggestion is hardly unprecedented. Classical realists like Machiavelli have long sought 
to articulate useful heuristics rather than ideal states of affairs. Meanwhile, pragmatists like Dewey 
have approached normative theorizing in very similar terms (Anderson 2014). Most recently, self-
proclaimed realists who object to Williams’ focus on maintaining legitimate order have sought to 
emphasize future-oriented action instead (Phulwani 2016, 2019; Sabl 2001). Some have even seen 
a more radical, action-oriented model in the work of Geuss (Philp 2010; Prinz 2016; Thaler 2018). 
Though his perspective is often assimilated to that of Williams—and there are certainly parallels—
Geuss (2008) doubts the usefulness of legitimacy as a central normative category, observing that 
beliefs about legitimacy “are often as confused, potentially contradictory, incomplete, and pliable 
as anything else” (36). Instead, “political philosophy must recognise that politics is in the first 
instance about action and the contexts of action, not about mere beliefs or propositions” (11). 
My own proposal is in this spirit, merging realist and pragmatist concerns (see Bagg 2016). 
Instead of working backwards from a hypothetical state of full justice or legitimacy to derive an 
appropriate response to the non-ideal circumstances we actually face, I suggest that we might 
generate more reliable practical guidance by working forwards from those circumstances. Simply 
put, we ask: which of our available options seems like the best bet, all things considered? Focusing 
on a particular political agent, more specifically—whether it is an individual, a pressure group, a 
political party, or a state—we try to sketch out the most relevant choices and constraints it faces. 
We then predict the likely consequences of each choice, accounting for genuine uncertainty as best 
we can, and assess the overall relative desirability of these possible future pathways. 
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Crucially, this comparison is made directly and holistically, in view of our overall normative 
sensibilities, and not as the application of a higher-order principle.8 These holistic judgments are 
meant to incorporate all of the normative concerns we accept as relevant within the situation at 
hand—whether conceived as “internal” or “external” reasons. And they form the basic data for an 
inductive process of theory construction, the results of which are normative heuristics that may 
also be conceived in either subjectivist or objectivist terms. Drawing on our experience of how our 
prior judgments have turned out, as well as any insights we may glean from history and social 
science, we generalize from our particular judgments to construct broader heuristics that are 
relevant across many circumstances. Political actors often face dilemmas with certain recurring 
features, and thus find themselves in need of reliable criteria for navigating those difficult choices. 
On my account, that is where theory steps in. In short, an action-oriented political realism 
articulates heuristics for action that might help various actors make recurring political choices. 
In some cases, these heuristics may have a fairly narrow scope, applying only to a specific set 
of circumstances. If so, they may generate relatively precise rules for judgment. A community 
leader might create a decision-tree for responding to incidents of police violence, for instance, 
grounded in the experiences of those in similar contexts (see, e.g., Stout 2012). And if following 
these rules reliably helps her achieve her normative aims—i.e., if the guidance they generate 
generally accords with her overall normative sensibility—they serve as an action-oriented theory.9 
Perhaps of greater interest to most political theorists, however, are heuristics with a broader 
scope. For example, a theory of campaign ethics might provide guidelines for how to engage 
competitively in the rough-and-tumble world of electoral politics, without undermining the very 
                                                          
8 The idea that comparative judgments do not require direction from higher-order ideals is familiar from Sen (2009). 
Though my approach is also comparative, it differs in comparing actions rather than states of affairs. 
9 Again: by normative aims, I mean any of the normative reasons we perceive ourselves to have. Insofar as we aim 
to fulfil our (political) duties and/or serve the interests of others, action-oriented theories help us do so effectively. 
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democratic values that justify the practice of elections in the first place (Bagg and Tranvik 2019). 
Similarly, a theory of militant democracy might provide guidelines for how state actors can prevent 
internal threats to democratic stability—and how to respond when they materialize—in ways that 
do not themselves threaten democratic stability (Kirshner 2014; Schedler 2020). Such mid-range 
theories will still have little to say about many political questions, such as the proper tax rate or 
healthcare system, but they do provide relatively clear guidance to those facing certain important 
and recurring dilemmas. And though this guidance will rarely be as simple or precise as a decision 
tree, mid-range theories can still highlight specific problems and recommend particular solutions. 
Finally, we can also develop action-oriented theories at even higher levels of generality. For 
instance, an action-oriented realist might aim to outline a set of goals to guide the development of 
state policy within 21st century capitalist democracies (Bagg Forthcoming). Given its extraordinary 
breadth of scope, of course, any heuristics generated by such a theory must remain quite general, 
leaving a great deal of room for further empirical inquiry, contextual judgment, and revision. 
Rather than claiming to compel acceptance by laws of deductive inference, action-oriented theories 
function as hypotheses. If they employ accurate empirical premises, plausible normative intuitions, 
and sound arguments, they will prove useful to people who seek reliable guidance in making 
difficult political judgments. If not, they will not. And though they refrain from providing strict or 
precise rules, out of respect for the vast uncertainty of social life, such highly general heuristics 
can still serve to focus our ameliorative attention and shape our judgment in significant ways. 
In this way, an action-oriented approach manages to avoid persistent tradeoffs between realism 
and ambition. On the one hand, theories oriented towards distant states of affairs will have trouble 
giving reliable guidance. If they are presumed to apply directly to practice, such theories will often 
generate guidance that is obviously harmful or counterproductive. If not, however, they simply 
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generate no guidance at all. Either way, ambition comes at the cost of realism. On the other hand, 
less ambitious theories of legitimacy can claim to escape this fate only by orienting practical 
guidance towards states of affairs that are very nearby, thus sacrificing ambition. So long as they 
aim at the justification of entire social systems or regimes, political theories must accept one (or 
both) of these shortcomings, and will therefore fail to provide reliable guidance. 
By starting from where we are rather than where we want to end up, by contrast, an action-
oriented approach enables us to be realistic without sacrificing ambition. To be clear, it does not 
achieve this feat by escaping or ignoring the vast uncertainty involved in predicting complex social 
dynamics. In focusing squarely on the concrete choices that are actually available to specific 
political agents, rather, the action-oriented approach addresses that uncertainty head-on. More 
specifically, it minimizes the obstacles that uncertainty poses for the project of general theorizing, 
by making use of an obvious epistemic asymmetry. Though our empirical knowledge and 
predictive accuracy are never perfect, in short, the epistemic challenges we face grow ever larger 
as our time horizon extends further into the future (Barrett 2020). 
In light of this, we may compare the two processes for generating practical guidance more 
directly. When using conventional ideals of justice and legitimacy, we evaluate potential choices 
with reference to the likelihood that they will help to bring about a particular set of institutional 
arrangements or coordinated behaviors. Generating reliable guidance thus depends on our ability 
not only to assess the desirability of that distant state of affairs, but also to identify the transitional 
path most likely to realize it. Both elements of the theory must be developed with a relatively high 
degree of specificity, and if either is mistaken, the practical guidance it generates is likely to be 
wrong. Given that our predictive accuracy decreases as we move further into the future—and as 
the effects of predictive errors multiply—this does not bode well for the reliability of that guidance. 
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On an action-oriented approach, by contrast, we need not develop an ideal state of affairs in 
any detail, nor make any tenuous predictions about which course of action will get us there. Rather 
than choosing the option that seems most likely to bring about a distant state of affairs, we choose 
the one whose foreseeable consequences appear best, on the whole, relative to the other available 
options. We do have to make predictions about the likely outcomes of the salient choices we face, 
therefore, but we are able to internalize the uncertainty involved in these predictions, making it a 
central part of the process of judgment. In evaluating the relative desirability of the options we 
have, in other words, we may place greater weight on outcomes we have greater certainty about, 
while discounting our more speculative projections about the distant future. In response to the vast 
uncertainty of social life, we ground our judgments in our areas of greatest relative certainty.  
This is not possible on an approach that is oriented towards a state of ideal justice or sufficient 
legitimacy, which necessarily anchors our reflections about particular judgments in a relatively 
precise set of conditions or requirements that must be achieved or approximated. By unmooring 
ourselves from this fixed endpoint and anchoring ourselves instead in the possibilities of the 
present, we minimize the uncertainty we must face, and maximize the reliability of our guidance. 
As noted, a full elaboration, defense, and application of this model must await future work. In 
this preliminary sketch, however, I hope to have sharpened my critique of realist arguments for 
prioritizing legitimacy by establishing the viability of an alternative realist methodology. Because 
it speaks directly to practice—evaluating the concrete options of particular agents—this model 
promises more reliable guidance than is possible with a focus on the legitimacy of a social system 
or political regime as a whole. At the same time, it is perfectly friendly to traditional “realist” goals 
like maintaining order, peace, and procedural legitimacy. Since their collapse threatens such 
disastrous consequences, protecting these achievements will often be the wisest course of action.  
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As I argue in the final section, however, there may also be contexts in which our best option, 
all things considered, is to agitate for radical transformations of the status quo—including, at the 
limit, by making strategic sacrifices of basic liberal-democratic legitimacy. Despite its clear 
importance, that is, we need not understand legitimate order as any more political or practically 
necessary than other demands, nor grant it normative priority as a matter of principle. On the 
contrary, I claim, radical goals like unconditional basic income or prison abolition can also be 
“realist” demands—just so long as we clearly connect them to concrete situations in which they 
could plausibly (and non-counterproductively) inform our action (see McKean 2016; Thaler 2018). 
§5. The moderation account: legitimacy as a pragmatic necessity 
To illustrate this point, I turn to a third realist argument for the priority of legitimacy, which I 
call the “moderation” account. On this account, “prioritizing legitimacy” is a practical heuristic 
that opposes any challenge to status-quo liberal-democratic norms and institutions—at least under 
certain widespread conditions—even when the risks appear minor. The reasoning for this can be 
understood in terms of two key premises: (a) avoiding the collapse of liberal democracy is more 
important than any other goals we have; and (b) opposing challenges to status-quo liberal-
democratic norms and institutions is the best way to preserve the stability of liberal democracy. 
Since these arguments are pragmatic and aimed at specific contexts of judgment, they can be 
understood to employ something like the action-oriented method I have outlined. Examining the 
moderation account thus enables me to further elaborate that method. In positing an association 
between realist methods and the priority of basic legitimacy over radical demands, meanwhile, this 
account poses an important objection to my substantive claim that this association is illusory. As 
such, my discussion of moderation realists also allows me to refute this objection, and thereby to 
defend the possibility of radical forms of realism. Indeed, the substantive and methodological aims 
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of this section are intimately related. In short, I argue, moderation realists give unreliable practical 
guidance because they ignore important features of the context of action they consider, and thus 
fail to comprehensively realize the demands of the action-oriented model. I do not conclude from 
this that realists must be radicals, but I do aim to establish that they can be.10 
The basic claim of moderation realists is that averting dangerous cycles of polarization and 
backlash requires subordinating radical aims to the protection of status-quo liberal-democratic 
norms and institutions—even if the status quo is significantly unjust (Galston 2018; Mounk 2018). 
Given the dangers of authoritarianism on both political extremes, it is claimed, responsible political 
actors of any persuasion must throw their weight behind centrists and moderates, at least until the 
“immediate” threats to democratic stability are defeated (Frum 2019). Failure to compromise will 
only fan the flames of polarization, making it harder to oppose authoritarian backsliding (Graham 
and Svolik 2020). Often, suppression of radical goals is seen as especially urgent on issues of 
identity and migration. David Miller (2016b) and William Galston (2018), for instance, argue that 
cultural elites must scale back cosmopolitan ambitions in recognition of the limited capacity of 
“ordinary” people to accept rapid changes to their national identity.11 
In broad strokes, these arguments appear to follow the method outlined above: instead of 
articulating requirements for full justice or legitimacy, they begin with a concrete situation of 
judgment facing political leaders, and proceed by comparing the likely outcomes of alternative 
actions. Moreover, their key predictions are compelling. History and social science provide ample 
evidence that polarization and ethnocentric nationalism can facilitate democratic breakdown 
                                                          
10 As noted, this reinforces arguments made by other “radical” realists (Finlayson 2017; Mantena 2012; Phulwani 
2016; Prinz 2016; Raekstad 2018). However, many liberal realists also reject the association between a realistic 
methodology and substantively minimal demands (Levy 2016, 330–32; Sabl 2017). 
11 In Miller’s case, this fits naturally with the more general principled claim (examined above) that schemes of 
justice must be constrained by what democratic citizens can plausibly accept (see also Miller 2013) For Galston, the 
argument is more thoroughly pragmatic: averting democratic breakdown requires compromise with attitudes 
disdained by elites as “bigoted” or “intolerant.”  
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(Levitsky and Ziblatt 2018). Thus, there is clearly something valuable—and distinctively 
“realist”—about these warnings. All things equal, polarization and hyper-partisanship do threaten 
democratic stability, and the dangers of popular backlash are all too real. 
All things are never equal, however, and the concerns of moderation realists cannot be treated 
as decisive. In order to generate reliable guidance, rather, we must weigh them against others. 
Once again, then, the “basic legitimacy” proffered by those who claim to represent the “realist” 
view fails to merit the absolute priority they grant it. For one, there may be good reasons to doubt 
premise (a) of the moderation realists’ argument: i.e., that preserving the stability of liberal 
democracy is weightier than other goals. Here, however, I accept premise (a) and focus instead on 
objections to premise (b): i.e., that refusing to challenge status-quo liberal-democratic norms and 
institutions is the best way to preserve the overall, long-term stability of liberal democracy. 
Consider, to begin with, that limited popular patience for mass immigration is hardly the only 
relevant constraint facing those making border policy. As David Watkins (2018) points out, for 
instance, global economic forces reliably create intense pressures for cross-border migration, and 
in many cases, political leaders have strong incentives to allow it—to satisfy business or diplomatic 
interests, perhaps—even if it means ignoring majority opinion and/or turning a blind eye to illicit 
migration flows (Bacon 2008; Piketty 2020, 1022–23). This constraint is no less real or significant, 
but it is typically ignored by moderation realists. As Watkins observes, indeed, even many 
advocates of open borders simply accept that realism implies limits on migration flows, and thus 
defend their commitments on explicitly “idealist” or “utopian” grounds instead. 
A more comprehensive employment of the action-oriented approach, however, could lead us 
to embrace such radical goals on perfectly “realist” grounds. Domestic opposition to immigration 
may be strong, but is it really a more permanent condition than war, climate change, creative 
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destruction, and other drivers of migration? If not, persuading citizens of wealthy nations to accept 
more migrants may actually be the most realistic way of resolving these persistent tensions. This 
becomes even clearer if we reject the implicit focus of much political philosophy on the choices 
facing statesmen, and instead consider those facing activists and organizers (Phulwani 2016, 
2019). After all, persuading ordinary citizens is the primary vector of change available to such 
non-state actors. If we truly account for all relevant constraints and potential actors, it seems, 
radical solutions may appear as the most realistic answers to the knot of issues we face. 
A similar argument applies to the broader claim that compromise is necessary to prevent 
polarization and democratic backsliding. Again, these dangers are distressingly real, and we must 
account for them in any comprehensive judgment. Yet here too, moderation realists lead us astray 
in emphasizing it to the exclusion of others. Once we have a more complete picture of the context 
of action we face, we may find that compromise is not a particularly realistic response after all. 
When faced with opponents who will degrade democracy regardless of one’s own actions, for 
one, unilateral disarmament will only yield further deterioration of liberal-democratic norms and 
institutions (Bagg and Tranvik 2019; Schedler 2020). Think of Frederick Douglass’ (2016, 207) 
call for “the storm, the whirlwind, and the earthquake” in facing the intransigence of the American 
slave power—rather than the “gentle shower” of “convincing argument”—or Martin Luther King 
Jr.’s (1993, 842) denunciation of “white moderates” a century later. Douglass and King were non-
state actors, of course, but the political leaders most influenced by their appeals—Abraham 
Lincoln and Lyndon Johnson, respectively—also realized eventually that advancing democracy 
required the abandonment of compromise in favor of active polarization. In the face of intransigent 
anti-democratic opponents, it seems, polarizing tactics may actually promote the long-term 
stability of liberal democracy (for contemporary arguments, see Faris 2018; Keck 2020). 
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Even if one’s opponents are not so intransigent, moreover, action-oriented realists may still 
view compromise as inadequate. In particular, if preserving the status quo will only intensify the 
tensions we seek to address—as with global migration flows—then doing so is not a particularly 
realistic strategy. For instance, many believe that maintaining trends such as deepening inequality, 
declining unions, and growing oligarchic power will only strengthen the appeal of authoritarian 
populism (e.g., Rodrik 2018). If we accept this diagnosis, moderation and compromise—even if 
possible—would at best only postpone more serious crises (Streeck 2014). Truly weakening the 
forces contributing to crisis, by contrast, will require a more radical response (Purdy 2018). 
Of course, not everyone will accept this diagnosis. My arguments might therefore appear to 
hang precariously on controversial empirical claims. Yet I see this as an unavoidable consequence 
of the aspiration for reliable practical guidance. On an action-oriented approach, indeed, evaluating 
rival social theories—and synthesizing their insights—would become a major part of the job 
description of realist political theory (Bagg 2016, 239–40). Clearly, I have not actually done this 
work here: demonstrating that any particular radical strategy is the most promising response to 
global challenge would require far more extensive empirical and predictive inquiry than I have 
been able to pursue here. That, however, was never my aim in this section. Rather, my goal was 
simply to defend the possibility of radical realism against the claims of moderation realists. 
Fortunately, the success of this argument does not depend on the truth of any given social theory.12  
The social theories employed by moderation realists are plausible, and so the dangers they cite 
must be accounted for. Yet if the social theories I have offered are also plausible, moderation 
realists cannot infer a robust prohibition on challenges to liberal-democratic norms and institutions 
                                                          
12 Indeed, my general methodological approach is compatible with a wide range of social theories—even those 
whose substantive implications are diametrically opposed to those I suggest. For instance, Hayekian radicals argue 
against “moderation” on the grounds that it would lead inevitably to “serfdom” (Hayek 1984). My objection to this 
approach lies with the substantive plausibility of the social theory they rely upon, rather than their methodology. 
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from worries about polarization and backlash. Even if we accept that preserving liberal democracy 
must be our top priority, it is simply false that challenging status quo norms and institutions always 
threatens that end. In order to establish that any particular radical stratagem actually endangers the 
overall, long-term stability of liberal democracy, therefore, moderation realists would also need to 
do far more comprehensive empirical and predictive work than they have done. In the end, that is 
all an action-oriented realism demands. The idea is simply to present plausible hypotheses and 
support them as well as we can—remembering always that prediction is hard, and that our 
substantive conclusions must therefore remain explicitly provisional.  
What we can conclude more securely from my arguments in this section, meanwhile, is that in 
doing this context-dependent work, we are unlikely to reach the sort of categorical conclusions 
many political realists have drawn about the priority of legitimacy. Action-oriented realists might 
have many reasons to challenge status-quo norms and institutions and embrace radical goals—
indeed, they might even do so in the name of preserving liberal democracy over the long run. As 
such, there is no general connection between methodological realism and substantive moderation.  
§6. Conclusion 
In this article, I have sought to demonstrate that all of the major “realist” arguments for the 
priority of basic order and legitimacy employ a limited vision of what counts as properly political 
or realistic. For that reason, they actually foreclose a more fully realistic process of practical 
political judgment. As I showed in §2, there is no basis for metanormative claims that the demands 
of basic order and legitimacy are more political than other, more ambitious demands. As I argued 
in §3, we should also reject proceduralist arguments that certain basic procedures provide a less 
controversial basis for resolving other, more substantive disagreements. And as I demonstrated in 
§5, we have ample reason to doubt the claims of moderation realists that the preservation of status-
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quo norms and institutions is always better for the stability of liberal democracy than the pursuit 
of other, more radical alternatives. In §4, of course, I also began to suggest an alternative, “action-
oriented” approach to political realism. Yet this is only a preliminary sketch, and its function here 
is primarily to bolster my critique of realists’ obsession with legitimacy—which, as I have shown, 
wrongly displaces more radical and ambitious substantive demands.  
At the broadest level, then, the spirit of my argument can be encapsulated by a common refrain 
of activists and organizers: “no justice, no peace.” William Clare Roberts (2018) explains:  
To more conservative auditors, it is a threat. To more sympathetic ears, it is a social 
scientific hypothesis: “Without justice, … peace will be an elusive goal.” I have 
always heard it as an expression of hope: We hope that, if justice is not done, people 
will continue to fight… to turn the non-peace of being subject to the unconstrained 
power of another into the open struggle that might bring justice and, with it, peace. 
What if the protesters are right? What if peace is not a precondition of the pursuit 
of justice, but something made possible, hopefully, by justice’s achievement? What 
if the salient barrier to peace is not war but domination? Would that change the 
“realistic” assessment?  
My contention has been that it would—not in every case, perhaps, but often enough that it is 
requires a reconsideration of the common association between methodological realism and a 
substantive priority for the more “basic” demands of legitimate order. If we want our theories to 
provide useful guidance to real political actors, we may conclude, realists ought to take a firm and 
confident stand against the priority of legitimacy. 
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